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UNWED FATHERS: AN ANALYTICAL SURVEY OF
THEIR PARENTAL RIGHTS AND
OBLIGATIONS
At common law the natural parents of illegitimate children had no
significant legal relationship to their children.' Over time, however, the
law vested exclusive right to custody in the unwed mother and charged
her with complete responsibility for the support of her illegitimate chil-
dren.2 The law later provided the unwed father a right to custody, sub-
ject to the paramount right of the mother, and accordingly imposed on
him a support obligation.' Today, as a result of recent constitutional
interpretation, 4 the legal rights and obligations of natural fathers of il-
legitimate children more closely coincide with those of not only natural
mothers, but fathers of legitimate children as well.
This Note surveys the present legal role of unwed fathers by noting
changes in traditional law, comparing the legal role of fathers of illegit-
imate children with that of both unwed mothers and fathers of legiti-
mate children, and emphasizing unresolved or potential developments
in the law. Sections I and II examine the legal role and obligations of
unwed fathers. Sections III, IV, and V analyze the unwed fathers'
rights to adoption, custody, and visitation of their illegitimate children.
I. LEGAL RECOGNITION OF THE UNWED FATHER'S PARENTAL ROLE
A. Constitutional Recognition of Parental Role. Stanley v. Illinois
The most significant case in this decade to recognize, protect, and
extend the unwed father's parental role in the lives of his illegitimate
children is Stanley v. Illinois.5 In Stanley the unwed father had lived
intermittently for eighteen years with his illegitimate children's unwed
mother and assumed parental responsibility for the children. Upon the
1. See Harkins, Putative Father's Visitation Rights, 19 CLEV. ST. L. REv. 549, 550 (1970);
Reeves, Protecting the Putative Father's Rights After Stanley v. Illinois: Problems in Implementa-
ton, 13 J. FANi. L. 115, 116-17 (1973-74).
2. See Harkins, supra note 1; Reeves, supra note 1.
3. See Harkins, supra note 1; Reeves, supra note 1.
4. See Caban v. Mohammed, 441 U.S. 380 (1979); Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645 (1972);
cj Quilloin v. Walcott, 434 U.S. 246 (1978) (due process and equal protection rights of unwed
father, who never had nor sought custody of illegitimate child, not violated by state statute deny-
ing all unwed fathers the right to veto application to adopt child).
5. 405 U.S. 645 (1972).
1029
Washington University Open Scholarship
1030 WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW QUARTERLY [Vol. 1979:1029
mother's death the State of Illinois removed the children from their
father's custody and, pursuant to the Illinois dependency statutes, 6 de-
clared them wards of the state without affording the father a hearing on
parental fitness and without proof of neglect, although all other parents
received such protections.7 Stanley, the unwed father, challenged the
statutes' constitutionality under the equal protection clause of the four-
teenth amendment, but the Illinois Supreme Court rejected his claim.8
The United States Supreme Court, however, acknowledged Stanley's
"cognizable and substantial interest" in retaining custody of his chil-
dren,9 and reversed the Illinois court's judgment on two grounds.'"
First, the Court held that the statutory presumption" that unmarried
fathers make unsuitable parents violated Stanley's due process right to
a prior hearing on his fitness as a parent.12 Second, the Court ruled
that the Illinois provisions denied Stanley equal protection of the law
by depriving him of the hearing afforded other parents on their suita-
bility to retain custody of their children.' 3
Stanley clearly extended constitutional protection to the natural fa-
ther's relationship with his illegitimate children. The decision imposed
due process procedural safeguards in state actions challenging an un-
wed father's custody of his illegitimate children. 4 Furthermore, Stan-
ley suggested that due process substantively restricts states from
terminating an unwed father's custody without first finding him unfit.' 5
Subsequent cases have extended and applied Stanley's due process
6. ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 37, §§ 701-14, 702-1, -5 (Smith-Hurd 1972).
7. The children ofmarried parents, divorced parents, and unmarried mothers were declared
neglected children only after a hearing and proof of neglect. 405 U.S. at 658.
8. In re Stanley, 45 IUl. 2d 132, 256 N.E.2d 814 (1970).
9. 405 U.S. at 652.
10. Id. at 659.
11. Although the majority spoke of a statutory presumption throughout its due process dis-
cussion, the dissent argued that the statute did not raise this presumption. Id at 662 (Burger, C.J.,
dissenting).
12. Id. at 649.
13. Id at 658.
14. See generally id at 649, 658. Although the precise issue confronting the Court concerned
the state's right to omit unwed fathers from the definition of "parents"-in reality, an equal pro-
tection question, id at 659, 664 (Burger, CJ., dissenting)-the Court began its analysis with a due
process inquiry. The Court concluded that the administrative convenience of presuming rather
than proving Stanley's unfitness was "insufficient to justify refusing a father a hearing when the
issue at stake is the dismemberment of his family." Id. at 658. The Court justified its "prelimi-
nary" due process inquiry by noting that it could dispose of the case on the constitutional premise
raised below by a method of analysis available to the lower court. Id. at 658 n. 10.
15. See generally Caban v. Mohammed, 441 U.S. 380, 394 n.16 (1979); Quilloin v. Walcott,
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principles to other proceedings that affect an unwed father's parental
interests, 6 including actions for adoption, 7 legitimation,'8 paternity, 19
visitation,2" and termination of parental rights.2'
The Stanley Court, however, did not clearly enunciate the specific
procedural and substantive due process protections to be afforded un-
wed fathers in the numerous actions affecting their parental interests, 22
nor did it define those factors which courts should consider in deter-
mining what due process requires.23 More importantly, the Court
failed to identify carefully the unwed fathers who merit procedural
and, perhaps, substantive due process protection. At one point in its
434 U.S. 246, 247-48, 254-55 (1978); Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. at 651-52, 657-58; In re Adoption
of Mullenix, 359 So. 2d 65, 67 (Fla. Ct. App. 1978).
16. According to one commentator, "[a]n unwed father is entitled to notice of any proceeding
which affects the parent-child relationship." 8 ST. MARY's L.J. 392, 392 (1976). Broad language in
Stanle' seems to endorse the extension of its principles to other proceedings: "If [unwed fathers]
do care. . .Illinois would admittedly at some later time have to afford them a properly focused
hearing in a custody or adoption proceeding." 405 U.S. at 657 n.9 (emphasis added).
17. See, e.g., Caban v. Mohammed, 441 U.S. 380, 385 n.3 (1979); id at 414-17 (Stevens, J.,
dissenting); In re Tricia M., 74 Cal. App. 3d 125, 141 Cal. Rptr. 554 (1977); Slawek v. Covenant
Children's Home, 52 I11. 2d 20, 284 N.E.2d 291 (1972).
18. Seegenerally Quilloin v. Walcott, 434 U.S. 246 (1978).
19. See, e.g., In re Lisa R., 13 Cal. 3d 636, 532 P.2d 123, 119 Cal. Rptr. 475 (1975); Johan-
nesen v. Pfeiffer, 387 A.2d 1113 (Me. 1978); Slawek v. Stroh, 62 Wis. 2d 295, 215 N.W.2d 9 (1974).
20. See, e.g., Wingard v. Sill, 223 Kan. 661, 576 P.2d 620 (1978); Peterson v. Hayes, 252 Pa.
Super. Ct. 487, 381 A.2d 1311 (1977); Slawek v. Stroh, 62 Wis. 2d 295, 215 N.W.2d 9 (1974).
21. See, e.g., J.D.S. v. Edwards, 574 S.W.2d 405 (Mo. 1978); Slawek v. Stroh, 62 Wis. 2d 295,
215 N.W.2d 9 (1974).
22. Because Stanley involved only a dependency proceeding in which an unwed father's con-
tinued custody was at issue, the Court did not discuss those procedures which may suffice in other
proceedings. The Court emphasized, however, that "due process of law does not require a hearing
'in every conceivable case of government impairment of private interest.'. . . '[T]he very nature
of due process negates any concept of inflexible procedures universally applicable to every imagi-
nable situation .... .' 405 U.S. at 650 (quoting Cafeteria & Restaurant Workers Union v. Mc-
Elroy, 367 U.S. 886, 894-95 (1961)).
Stanley also did not address the kinds of substantive restraints required in other actions. The
Court left unclear whether a mere opportunity to offer proof on fitness or a "best interests of the
child" standard would adequately protect an unwed father against arbitrary state action in other
proceedings.
23. The Court stated that" 'what procedures due process may require under any given set of
circumstances must begin with a determination of the precise nature of the governmental function
involved as well as of the private interest that has been affected by governmental action.'" Id at
650-51 (quoting Cafeteria & Restaurant Workers Union v. McElroy, 367 U.S. 886, 895 (1961)).
The Court failed to discuss, however, what weight other factors, such as the child's best interests or
the mother's conflicting interests, should receive in the determination. (The Court, of course, had
no occasion to weigh the effect of an unwed mother's interests in her child because the mother in
Stanle' was dead). The Court also did not indicate whether and how these factors might affect
any substantive restrictions on state action.
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opinion, the Court stated that the father's protected interest is the "pri-
vate interest . . . of a man in the children he has sired and raised";2 4
yet, in a subsequent footnote it spoke in much broader language about
"[e]xtending opportunity for hearing to unwed fathers who desire and
claim competence to care for their children. ' 25 This ambiguity in the
Court's language has led to two distinct interpretations of the scope of
procedural due process in actions affecting unwed father's parental in-
terests. 26 One approach extends Stanley's procedural due process pro-
tection to all unwed fathers;27 the other confines that protection to those
unwed fathers who have exhibited some degree of interest in their chil-
dren.2
The Stanley Court also left ambiguous the nature and scope of its
equal protection holding. In contrast to its extensive treatment of the
due process issue, the Court dealt only superficially with the equal pro-
tection question.2 9 As a result, the Court failed to discuss whether or
24. Id at 651.
25. Id at 657 n.9.
26. See 58 MARQ. L. REv. 175, 176-77 (1975).
27. See, e.g., In re Tricia M., 74 Cal. App. 3d 125, 141 Cal. Rptr. 554 (1977) (statutory re-
quirement in adoption matter that an effort be made to identify natural father and give him notice
and opportunity to be heard complies with Stanley); In re Adoption of Lathrop, 575 P.2d 894
(Kan. Ct. App. 1978) (due process requires that unwed father be given actual notice of pending
adoption whenever possible or constructive notice whenever father's identity and whereabouts are
unknown and unascertainable by due diligence); Slawek v. Stroh, 62 Wis. 2d 295, 215 N.W.2d 9
(1974) (all natural fathers entitled to notice and opportunity to be heard before termination of
their parental rights).
Courts following this approach require actual notice to the natural father if his identity and
location are known, or constructive notice, if unknown. See, e.g., Lewis v. Lutheran Social Servs.,
59 Wis. 2d 1, 207 N.W.2d 826 (1973). These courts, however, must balance the parental interests
of unknown or unlocated fathers against the privacy interests of the unwed mothers. To comply
with the notice requirement of Stanley, therefore, unwed mothers might be required to identify
the unwed fathers. See, e.g., NJ. STAT. ANN. § 9:17-I1 (West 1976); UNIFORM PARENTAGE ACT
§§ 10(b), 25(b). Furthermore, inclusion of the mother's name in a constructive notice might be
required to alert the unwed father. Barron, Notice to the Unwed Father and Termination of Paren.
talRights: Implementing Stanley v. Illinois, 9 FAM. L.Q. 527, 545 (1975). Unfortunately, Stanley
provides little guidance for courts on how to balance these conflicting interests.
28. E.g., Department of Health & Rehabilitative Servs. v. Herzog, 317 So. 2d 865 (Fla. Dist.
Ct. App. 1975) (alleged natural father who showed no interest in illegitimate child need not be
given notice and opportunity to be heard before child is adopted).
Courts following this approach need not confront the conflicting interests problems discussed in
note 27 supra. An unwed father who has shown some degree of interest in his child is likely to be
known and visible in the community. Thus, the mother has no privacy interest in maintaining the
secrecy of his identity.
29. The Court summarily disposed of the equal protection question in one short paragraph.
"[A]ll Illinois parents are constitutionally entitled to a hearing on their fitness before their children
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol1979/iss4/5
UNWED FATHERS
how unwed fathers, consistent with the demands of equal protection,
could ever be classified apart from married parents, married fathers,
divorced fathers, or unwed mothers.30  The Court also provided no
equal protection guidelines for other parent-child proceedings.3'
B. Constitutional Recognition After Stanley: Quilloin v. Walcott and
Caban v. Mohammed
The Court's first significant interpretation of the Stanley principles
came in Quilloin v. Walcott.32 In Quilloin the natural father of an ille-
gitimate child never had exercised or sought actual or legal custody
over his child. Nine years after the mother married, her husband
sought to adopt the child under a Georgia statute that required only the
consent of the mother for adoption of an illegitimate child unless the
natural father had legitimated the child.33 Georgia adoption law re-
quired the consent of both the legitimate child's living parents, includ-
ing those divorced or separated, unless a parent had been adjudged
unfit or had voluntarily surrendered his parental rights.34 The natural
father, upon notification of the adoption petition, filed an application
for a writ of habeas corpus to obtain visitation rights, a petition for
legitimation, and an objection to the adoption; subsequently, he
amended his pleadings to challenge the constitutionality of the state
statute under the due process and equal protection clauses of the four-
teenth amendment. 35 After a full hearing at which the father had an
opportunity to offer evidence of his fitness, the trial court, without mak-
ing a particularized finding of unfitness, ruled that the constitutional
claims were without merit, denied the legitimation and visitation peti-
tions, and granted the adoption petition "in the best interests of the
are removed from their custody. .. . [Djenying such a hearing to Stanley and those like him
while granting it to other Illinois parents is inescapably contrary to the Equal Protection Clause."
405 U.S. at 658 (footnote omitted).
30. The Court did not examine whether the difficulties in locating and identifying unwed
fathers or the absence of established parental relationships might, at least in some cases, justify
distinctions between unwed fathers and other classes of parents.
31. The Court did not discuss what weight the factors observed in note 30 supra should re-
ceive in a proceeding in which a state arguably has a more significant interest. An unwed father's
past relationship with his child may be of less significance in an adoption proceeding in which the
state seeks to give full recognition to a de facto family unit already in existence.
32. 434 U.S. 246 (1978).
33. GA. CODE § 74-403(3) (1973).
34. Id. §§ 74-403(1), -403 (2).
35. 434 U.S. at 250.
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child. 36 The Georgia Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the trial
court, relying on both the strong state policy in favor of rearing chil-
dren in a family setting and the failure of the natural father to take
steps to support or legitimate his child over a period of more than
eleven years.37
The United States Supreme Court unanimously affirmed the judg-
ment of the Georgia Supreme Court.38 The Court reasoned that, under
the circumstances of this case, the due process clause did not require
the state "to find anything more than that the adoption, and denial of
legitimation, was in the 'best interests of the child.' ,39 Even though the
father was not found to be an unfit parent, he neither had nor ever
sought actual or legal custody over the child; further, the adoption
would give "full recognition to a family unit already in existence. '40 In
response to the natural father's equal protection claim, the Court held
that the state could properly grant him less authority to veto the adop-
tion of his child than it provided a married father, even one who was
divorced or separated.4' Because this unwed father, unlike a married,
separated, or divorced father, never had shouldered any significant re-
sponsibility for the supervision, education, protection, or care of his
child, the state could validly distinguish this unwed father from a mar-
ried father.42
The Court's opinion in Quilloin provides some direction for applying
the Stanley principles. The Quilloin Court expressly addressed a sub-
stantive due process question and purported to recognize substantive
due process rights in unwed fathers.43 Furthermore, the decision sug-
36. Id at 251-52.
37. Id at 252-53; 238 Ga. 230, 232 S.E.2d 246 (1977).
38. 434 U.S. 246 (1978).
39. Id at 255.
40. Id
41. Id at 256.
42. Id The Court expressly reserved the question of whether the Georgia statutes unconstitu-
tionally distinguished unwed parents on the basis of gender. Id at 253 n.13.
43. Though the unwed father's substantive rights were not violated by application of a "best
interests of the child" standard, the Court expressly recognized substantive due process rights in
the father in Quilloi Id at 254. If an unwed father who has shown little or no interest in his
child has substantive rights, then arguably, most if not all unwed fathers merit some substantive
due process protection. The Court premised its due process discussion on the following observa-
tion:
We have recognized on numerous occasions that the relationship between parent and
child is constitutionally protected .... It is cardinal with us that the custody, care and
nurture of the child reside first in the parents, whose primary function and freedom
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol1979/iss4/5
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gests various interests that should be considered in determining the
scope and potency of these rights, such as the child's best interests, the
father's past and present responsibility over the child, and the existence
or nonexistence of a de facto family unit. The Court left for future
cases, however, how these interests should be weighed in other situa-
tions" and what other interests might be relevant to the determina-
tion.45
Despite the guidance offered by Quilloin, several questions remain.
In analyzing the father's due process rights, the Quilloin Court ac-
knowledged a distinction between custodial and noncustodial fathers,
but left unclear the precise significance of this distinction. The Court
expressly recognized that the trial court had afforded a hearing to the
unwed father, but did not state whether a hearing was constitutionally
required.46 The Court specifically noted that the state had afforded the
unwed father an opportunity to present proof of his fitness at a hearing,
but did not assert that due process required the state to hear that proof.
Whether the state would have been more severely restrained by the
dictates of due process had the father been a custodial, responsible fa-
ther remains an open question .4  The Court held simply that the fa-
ther's substantive due process rights in this case had not been
impermissibly burdened by the state's application of the "best interests
of the child" standard.
The Court's treatment of the equal protection issue also leaves open
include preparation for obligations the state can neither supply nor hinder.". . . And it
is now firmly established that "freedom of personal choice in matters of. . .family life
is one of the liberties protected by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment."
Id at 255 (citations omitted).
44. Different results might obtain, for example, if the father had sought but was denied cus-
tody, if no de facto family existed at the time he petitioned for legitimation, or if the best interests
of the child favored custody in the father.
45. Other relevant factors might include the past and present interest and involvement of the
mother, the father, and the state.
46. Id at 253-54 (suggesting that due process requires procedural protections for all fathers).
See notes 26-28 supra and accompanying text.
47. The Court suggested that had the father been a custodial, responsible father, the state
would have been required to prove the father unfit before permitting the adoption over his objec-
tion:
We have little doubt that the Due Process Clause would be offended "[ijf a State were
to attempt to force the breakup of a natural family, over the objections of the parents and
their children, without some showing of unfitness and for the sole reason that to do so
was thought to be in the children's best interest."
434 U.S. at 255 (citation omitted).
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a significant question. The Quilloin Court recognized that unwed fa-
thers could be distinguished from other classes of parents, or at least
married fathers, in a manner consistent with equal protection, because
the unwed father had not assumed responsibility for the child.48
Whether this factor can justify classifications between fathers in other
parental rights cases remains uncertain.
The most recent Supreme Court case to scrutinize the unwed father's
parental relationship with his illegitimate child is Caban v. Moham-
med.49 In Caban the unwed father lived with his illegitimate children
(and their mother) and contributed to their support for several years
after their births. When the parents separated, the unwed mother took
custody of the children and married. Sometime later the natural father,
who had maintained contact with his children, by stealth took the chil-
dren from their grandmother's temporary custody. The mother and her
spouse then obtained a temporary custody order and filed a petition to
adopt the children. The natural father and his new wife cross-peti-
tioned for adoption, but a New York family court ruled that the best
interests of the child would be served by severing all parental rights
and obligations of the father and allowing the mother and her husband
to adopt the children.5" Under New York law, an unwed father, unlike
an unwed mother, had no authority to block the adoption of his chil-
dren by withholding his consent.51 The unwed father could prevent his
child's adoption only by showing that the adoption would not be in the
child's best interests.5z
After receiving unfavorable dispositions from the New York appel-
late courts, 53 the unwed father challenged the New York law before the
Supreme Court on two grounds. First, he argued that the statutory dis-
tinction between the "adoption rights" of unwed fathers and those of
other parents violated the equal protection clause of the fourteenth
amendment.54 Second, he contended that the statute denied his right
48. See notes 41-42 supra and accompanying text.
49. 441 U.S. 380 (1979).
50. Id at 383-84.
51. N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW § 111 (McKinney 1977).
52. 441 U.S. at 387.
53. In re David A.C., 43 N.Y.2d 708, 372 N.E.2d 42, 401 N.Y.S.2d 208 (1977); In re David
Andrew C., 56 A.D.2d 627, 391 N.Y.S.2d 846 (1976).
54. 441 U.S. at 385. The Court reformulated the father's equal protection challenge, as re-
flected in its holding, to specifically address the validity of the gender-basis of the classification.
Id at 382, 388. See also id at 389 n.7.
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol1979/iss4/5
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under the due process clause to maintain a parental relationship with
his children absent a finding of his unfitness." In reversing the New
York courts, the Supreme Court addressed only the former ground,56
holding that the inflexible distinction between the rights of unwed
mothers and unwed fathers was an invalid gender-based distinction.57
Because the gender-based distinction bore no substantial relationship
to an important state interest-and, in particular, to the proclaimed
state interest in promoting the adoption of illegitimate children-the
classification deprived unwed fathers of equal protection of the laws."
In reaching its conclusion, the Court discussed various gender-based
classifications that might satisfy equal protection. The absence of past
responsibility for the child,59 for example, might justify a flexible gen-
der-based classification.6" Even an inflexible gender-based distinction,
similar to that in the New York statute, might be valid if addressed
specifically to newborn adoptions6 because of the special difficulties
attendant at birth upon locating and identifying unwed fathers and the
55. Id at 385.
56. In a footnote, the Court specifically stated that it "express[ed] no view as to whether a
State is constitutionally barred from ordering adoption in the absence of a determination that the
parent whose rights are being terminated is unfit." Id at 394 n.16. This footnote suggests that the
Court has yet to determine, to its satisfaction, the substantive due process rights of unwed fathers.
In the dissent's view, "the relationship between a father and his natural child [if and when one
develops] is entitled to protection against arbitrary state action as a matter of due process." Id at
414 (Stevens, J., dissenting). The dissent also commented that a state adoption decree might be
consistent with due process if supported by a finding that the adoption will serve the best interests
of the child. Id at 414-15.
57. Id at 382.
58. Id at 394.
59. See notes 4142 supra and accompanying text.
60. "In those cases where the father never has come forward to participate in the rearing of
his child, nothing in the Equal Protection Clause precludes the state from withholding from him
the privilege of vetoing the adoption of that child." 441 U.S. at 392.
The Court found that the father in Caban had established a substantial relationship with his
child. The father had supported the child, retained custody of the child, and maintained contact
w.ith the child when not in his custody. Furthermore, the father was seeking to adopt his child.
Relying on Quilloin, the Court reiterated the importance of "the relationship that in fact exists
between the parent and child." Id at 393 n. 14. The inflexible gender-based distinction made in
the New York law improperly disregarded these important relationships.
61. Id at 392-93. In a footnote, however, the Court specifically declined to address this issue.
Id at 392 n. 11. All the Court purported to conclude was that the inflexible New York distinction
could not be justified by "any universal difference between maternal and paternal relations at
every phase of a child's development." Id at 389. The dissent, on the other hand, read the
Court's opinion to hold the New York distinction invalid only insofar as it applied to fathers of
older children who had established a substantial relationship with their children and had admitted
their paternity. Id at 416 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
Washington University Open Scholarship
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absence of a substantial relationship between fathers and their
newborns.
62
C. Nonrecognition of Parental Rights by the States
In apparent conflict with Stanley,63 several states continue to exclude
all unwed fathers from the classification of "parents."'  Furthermore,
many states do not recognize as parents, or as having specific legal inci-
dents of parenthood, those unwed fathers who have not established or
affirmatively asserted their parental roles.65  These more refined dis-
tinctions may be justifiable, however, under Quilloin and Caban.66
In addition, most states rebuttably presume that a child born or con-
ceived in wedlock is legitimate.67 This presumption, which is normally
62. Id at 392-93.
63. See notes 11-12 supra and accompanying text. According to one commentator, the key
principle in Stanley is that a natural father is entitled to full parental rights absent a finding of his
unfitness. 25 BUFFALO L. REV. 787, 793 (1976).
64. Georgia, Mississippi, and New Jersey still maintain laws that exclude all unwed fathers
from the classification of parents. GA. CODE ANN. § 74-403(3) (1973) (mother of illegitimate child
is only "recognized" parent); Miss. CODE ANN. § 93-17-5 (1972) (father of illegitimate child is not
parent for adoption purposes); NJ. STAT. ANN. § 9:3-18(f) (West 1976) (father of illegitimate child
is not parent under adoption statute). But cf. B. v. E.B., 152 N.J. Super. 546, 378 A.2d 90 (Union
County Ct. 1977) (questioned statute's constitutionality and denied adoption in absence of unwed
father's consent).
The continued existence of these general exclusionary provisions may be more a product of
legislative indolence than of a conscious effort to disregard the Stanley directive.
65. A few states totally deny parental rights and status to unwed fathers who have not as-
serted or established that role. In Idaho, for example, the father of an illegitimate child is not
classified a "parent" unless he acknowledges his child and receives it into his family. See IDAHO
CODE §§ 16-1510, -2002 (1979).
More commonly, states deny only specific incidents of parenthood to unwed fathers who have
not established or asserted their parental roles. See, e.g., ALASKA STAT. §§ 20.15.040(a)(2) (1975),
20.15.050(a)(3) (Supp. 1979) (unwed father's consent to adoption required only if father has legiti-
mated the child); CONN. GEN. STAT. § 45-61d (1979) (notice of proceeding to terminate unwed
father's parental rights need be given only to an acknowledged or adjudicated father); FLA. STAT.
ANN. § 63.062 (West Supp. 1979) (unwed father's consent to adoption required if father is an
adjudicated or acknowledged father); GA. CODE ANN. § 74-203 (1973) (unwed father is not enti-
tled to custody of his child unless he legitimates the child).
66. See notes 40-42, 59-60 supra and accompanying text. It is likely that an unwed father
who has not established or asserted his parental role is a father who has not assumed parental
responsibility for his children. Quilloin and Caban indicate that in these circumstances a father
may not merit the same constitutional protection as a custodial, responsible father or an unwed
mother.
67. See Appendix A for a list of states that recognize presumptions of legitimacy. Most pre-
sumptions of legitimacy are rebuttable and generally arise when a child is conceived or born while
a man and woman are married. See, e.g., Knauer v. Barnett, 360 So. 2d 399 (Fla. 1978); Kuhns v.
Olson, 258 Iowa 1274, 141 N.W.2d 925 (1966). A few states recognize a conclusive presumption of
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given great weight,68 may operate to deny natural fathers recognition of
their parental roles in contravention of the Stanley principle that "a
presumption that distinguishes and burdens all unwed fathers" is con-
stitutionally repugnant.69 If a state is able to show, however, that its
presumption promotes significant state objectives, 70 it probably can tai-
lor its presumption to comply with Quilloin and Caban.
legitimacy when, for example, a child is born or conceived in a marriage characterized by cohabi-
tation of husband and wife. See, e.g.. Kusior v. Silver, 54 Cal. 2d 603, 354 P.2d 657, 7 Cal. Rptr.
129 (1960); OR. REv. STAT. § 41.350(b) (1977).
68. If the presumption is conclusive, it carries the weight of a rule of law. If the presumption
is rebuttable, the presumed father, and perhaps the natural father, may rebut the presumed pater-
nity. That rebuttal may be effectively denied, however, by imposing a stringent standard of proof
on the rebutter. See, e.g., Simpson v. Blackburn, 414 S.W.2d 795 (Mo. Ct. App. 1967) (presump-
tion of legitimacy of child born in wedlock is strongest presumption known to the law); In re
Scott's Estate, 61 S.D. 253, 248 N.W. 247 (1933) (same); IDAHO CODE § 7-1119 (1979) (presump-
tion of legitimacy of child born during wedlock is overcome only if all experts show that husband
is not the father); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 106 3/4, § 5 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1978) (same).
Some states do not permit unwed fathers to rebut the presumption of legitimacy. See, e.g., S.D.
COMP. LAWS ANN. § 25-5-4 (1976) (only husband and wife can dispute presumption).
Although some unwed fathers may appreciate these presumptions as an opportunity to escape
their moral responsibility to support their children (an opportunity not available to other fathers),
others might desire to satisfy their parental obligations.
69. 405 U.S. at 649. A presumption that effectively denies unwed fathers the opportunity to
rebut the presumed paternity of husbands and precludes these fathers from establishing their pa-
ternity is tantamount to a presumption that unwed fathers are not suitable parents. See In re Lisa
R., 13 Cal. 3d 636, 532 P.2d 123, 119 Cal. Rptr. 475 (1975) (presumption of legitimacy not rebutta-
ble by alleged unwed father held to deny his due process right to offer proof of his paternity);
notes 11-12 supra and accompanying text; note 73 infra and accompanying text. But see Smith v.
Gummo, I Civ. No. 40863 (Cal. Ct. App. 1977) (conclusive presumption of legitimacy held not to
deny alleged unwed father due process), appeal dismissed, 439 U.S. 802 (1978). Cf. Serafin v.
Serafin, 67 Mich. App. 517, 241 N.W.2d 272 (1976) (exclusion of husband or wife's testimony in
paternity dispute about access or nonaccess of husband to wife held to deny husband due process).
But cf. County of San Diego v. Brown, 80 Cal. App. 3d 297, 145 Cal. Rptr. 483 (1978) (conclusive
presumption of legitimacy held not to deny husband due process or equal protection).
70. In Murphy v. Houma Well Serv., 413 F.2d 509 (5th Cir. 1969), the court recognized that a
presumption of legitimacy furthers a state interest in protecting the intimate family relationship
from divisive and destructive attacks by those seeking to challenge the legitimacy of children born
during wedlock. Similarly, the court in In re Lisa R., 13 Cal. 3d 636, 532 P.2d 123, 119 Cal. Rptr.
475 (1975), suggested that the state's interests in relieving a child of the stigma of illegitimacy and
in promoting marriage by not impugning the family unit might justify rebuttable presumptions of
legitimacy.
71. Quilloin and Caban indicate that an unwed father who has not assumed parental respon-
sibility for his children may not merit the same constitutional protection as a custodial, responsi-
ble father. See notes 4042, 59-60, 66 supra and accompanying text. Thus, rebuttable
presumptions of legitimacy might be validly applied if no other man purports to be the father of a
presumably legitimate child, or if a man who purports to be the father of an illegitimate child has
not evidenced a parental relationship.
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D. Methods to Obtain Affirmative Recognition of Parental Rights
Unlike the married parent (and the unwed mother) whose legal pa-
rental role attaches at the birth of the child, the father of an illegitimate
child must affirmatively assert or establish his role to receive full legal
recognition of his parental rights.72 The Stanley decision and subse-
quent cases suggest that at least some unwed fathers have a constitu-
tional right to establish their paternity.73 In fact, most states provide
some affirmative device by which unwed fathers may obtain full legal
recoghition of their parental roles.74 States that do not provide such
mechanisms may unconstitutionally deny unwed fathers their parental
interests.
One device available in most states is a statutorily conferred right of
unwed fathers to legitimate their illegitimate children,7S a process
through which all reciprocal rights and duties between parent and child
attach to the father and his legitimated child.76 Although some states
condition the father's right to legitimate his child upon the consent of
the mother,77 "it is doubtful, under the Stanley decision, that the
72. Most states require unwed fathers to assert or establish parental relationships with their
illegitimate children to become recognized parents or to acquire certain incidents of parenthood.
See notes 65-66 supra and accompanying text. As a practical matter, moreover, all incidents of
parenthood cannot attach to a father until it is known who the father is. Thus, even states that
recognize the parental interests of all natural fathers require claim and proof of paternity before
they will vindicate a particular father's parental rights. See, e.g., UNIFORM PARENTAGE ACT
§§ 3(2), 25(d); Appendix A (listing the states that have adopted the Act).
73. See In re Lisa R., 13 Cal. 3d 636, 532 P.2d 123, 119 Cal. Rptr. 475 (1975) (denial of due
process to preclude unwed father who maintained contact with his child from establishing his
paternity); Johannesen v. Pfeiffer, 387 A.2d 1113 (Me. 1978) (because unwed fathers have a right
to establish their paternity, complaint seeking declaration of paternity should not have been dis-
missed).
74. See notes 75, 83-85 infra and accompanying text.
75. See Appendix B. One class of statutes legitimates an illegitimate child when the parents
marry. Another class legitimates a child on the petition, declaration, or acknowledgment of its
father. See generally Tabler, Paternal Rights in the Illegitimate Child- Some Legitimate ComFlaints
on Behalf of the Unwed Father, 11 J. FAM. L. 231, 236-42 (1971).
76. See, eg., IDAHO CODE § 16-1510 (1979) (legitimated child deemed legitimate for all pur-
poses); LA. CIv. CODE ANN. art. 199 (West 1952) (legitimated child has same rights as if child was
born during marriage); UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-30-12 (1977) (legitimated child deemed legitimate
for all purposes).
In some states, the father can legitimate his child only for particular enumerated purposes. See,
e.g., Hurst v. Wagner, 181 Wash. 498, 43 P.2d 964 (1935) (paternal acknowledgment conferred on
illegitimate child only the right to inherit from father); C. FOOTE, R. LEvY & F. SANDER, CASES
AND MATERIALS ON FAMILY LAW 645 (2d ed. 1976).
77. See, e.g., OHIO REv. CODE ANN. § 2105.18 (Page Supp. 1978) (consent of mother ex-
pressly required). According to one commentator, "For the most part, legitimation statutes are of
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mother could bar absolutely the child's being declared legitimate in re-
gard to the father," especially if the father demonstrates both an inter-
est in and a willingness to support the child.7 8 A number of states also
require the unwed father to prove his fitness under the "best interests of
the child" test to legitimate his child.7 9 Although Quilloin upheld the
use of this standard to deny the right of a noncustodial, irresponsible
father to legitimate his child,"0 the Court emphasized that the father
was attempting to use that device only to bar the adoption of his child
into a de facto family unit. t Furthermore, the Court recognized that
the father's attempt to legitimate his child, despite his motives, merited
some substantive protection under the due process clause of the four-
teenth amendment. 2 Thus, Quilloin implies that even if states can di-
lute the right of some unwed fathers to establish their parental roles by
legitimation, the states cannot deny unwed fathers the right altogether.
Many states provide judicial forums through which unwed fathers
can obtain legal recognition of their full parental roles. Some paternity
statutes expressly grant unwed fathers standing to pursue a determina-
little use to the father whose rights in his child are opposed by the mother. By law or practice, the
mother has an absolute veto over legitimation." Tabler, supra note 75, at 241.
Clearly, an unwed mother controls legitimation by intermarriage, as marriage is possible only
with the consent of the mother. In addition, however, many statutes permitting legitimation by
acts of the father require notice to the mother and subject the legitimation petition to the "best
interests of the child" test. See, e.g., ALA. CODE tit. 26, § 26-11-2 (1975); GA. CODE ANN. § 74-
103 (1973). Under these statutes the mother may effectively veto a legitimation by showing that it
is not in the child's "best interests," or the child's "best interests" may be defined so narrowly as to
preclude legitimation in most cases. Cf. Roe v. Conn, 417 F. Supp. 769 (D. Ala. 1976) (because
legitimation might be adverse to interests of mother and her illegitimate child in the exercise of
their family integrity, due process minimally requires that mother be given notice and opportunity
to object before legitimation takes effect).
78. Compare Schwartz, Rights of a Father With Regard to His Illegitimate Child, 36 OHIO ST.
L.J. 1, 7 (1975), with cases cited note 73 supra.
79. See note 77 supra. See also Roe v. Conn, 417 F. Supp. 769 (D. Ala. 1976) (probate court
must determine upon notification of objection to legitimation whether legitimation is in best inter-
ests of child); Quilloin v. Walcott, 238 Ga. 230, 232 S.E.2d 246 (1977) (trial court can deny legiti-
mation petition of unwed father who did not at any time have or seek custody of his child, if in
"best interests of the child"), aft'd, 434 U.S. 246 (1978); In re K., 535 S.W.2d 168 (Tex.) (trial
judge has discretion to deny petition of irresponsible, unwed father to legitimate his child, if best
interests of child require that result), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 907 (1976).
80. 434 U.S. at 253-54.
81. Id at 253-55. In a situation in which no de facto family unit exists, a state might not have
a sufficient interest to deny legitimation on the basis of the child's best interests; ie., the state
might have to find the father unfit to deny him legitimation.
82. See note 43 supra and accompanying text.
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tion of paternity. 3 In those jurisdictions with statutes that do not pro-
vide standing, unwed fathers might be able to bring an action in
equity84 or obtain a judicial declaration of their parental status.8 5
II. PARENTAL OBLIGATIONS
Although the law once placed liability for support of illegitimate
children solely on the unwed mother, all fifty states by statute currently
charge the unwed father with an obligation to support his illegitimate
children.86 In fact, numerous statutes impose the primary obligation of
support on the adjudicated natural father.87 Since 1970, however, the
majority of newly adopted state laws have imposed equal support obli-
gations on parents of legitimate children.88 The question thus arises
83. UNIFORM PARENTAGE AcT § 6(c) provides: "An action to determine the existence of the
father and child relationship with respect to a child who has no presumed father. . . may be
brought by. . . a man alleged or alleging himself to be the father." See Appendix A (listing the
states that have adopted the Act). But see Ford v. Loeffler, 363 So. 2d 23 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1978)
(Florida paternity cause of action does not extend to putative father). See also ALA. CODE tit. 26,
§ 26-12-1 (1975); CONN. GEN. STAT. §§ 46b-160, -162 (1979); IDAHO CODE § 7-1115 (1979); ILL.
ANN. STAT. ch. 106 3/4, § 54 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1978).
84. See generally Felder v. Allsopp, 391 A.2d 243 (D.C. 1978) (visitation privileges may be
acquired under equitable powers of court even though statute of limitations applicable to proceed-
ings to establish parentage has run).
Many jurisdictions impose a statute of limitations on proceedings to establish parentage. See,
e.g.,UNIFORM PARENTAGE AcT § 7; Appendix A (listing the states that have adopted the Act). In
some situations, application of these statutes may operate to deny unwed fathers an opportunity to
establish their paternity. But cf Texas Dep't of Human Resources v. Chapman, 570 S.W.2d 46
(Tex. Civ. App. 1978) (one-year limitation on bringing paternity suit held reasonably related to
legitimate state interest in precluding litigation of stale or fraudulent claims; no denial of illegiti-
mate children's due process or equal protection rights).
85. Several courts permit an unwed father to establish his paternity through a declaratory
judgment. See A.B. v. C.D., 150 Ind. App. 535, 277 N.E.2d 599 (1971); Johannesen v. Pfeiffer, 387
A.2d 1113 (Me. 1978); O.F.L. v. M.R.R., 518 S.W.2d 113 (Mo. Ct. App. 1974); Slawek v. Stroh, 62
Wis. 2d 295, 215 N.W.2d 9 (1974).
86. See TEx. FAM. CODE ANN. tit. 2, § 13.09 (Vernon Supp. 1978); Reeves, supra note 1, at
145-47 (citing statutes in all states except Texas).
87. See, e.g., Wingard v. Sill, 223 Kan. 661, 576 P.2d 620 (1978); CONN. GEN. STAT. § 46b-
171 (1979); GA. CODE ANN. § 74-202 (1973).
Sexual disparity in relative support obligations may be permissible as benign discrimination.
People v. Elliot, 186 Colo. 65, 525 P.2d 457 (1974) (father-only support statute upheld in reliance
on Kahn v. Shevin, 416 U.S. 351 (1974)). But Vf. Orr v. Orr, 440 U.S. 268 (1979) (Alabama
alimony statutes providing that husbands, but not wives, may be required to pay alimony upon
divorce held to create unconstitutional gender-based classification).
88. Foster & Freed, Life with Father: 1978, 11 FAM. L.Q. 321, 323 (1978). See Freed &
Foster, 3 FAM. L. REP. (BNA) 4047, 4052 (1977). In addition, equality of support obligations
probably is required in those states which have enacted an equal rights amendment. See C.
FOOTE, R. LEvY & F. SANDER, supra note 76, at 830.
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whether either the legislatures or the courts will extend these changes
uniformly to parents of illegitimate children.89
Unlike the father of a legitimate child, whose legal duty to support
arises at the child's birth, the unwed father generally becomes legally
liable for support only after some further affirmative action.90 The un-
wed father may never become legally obligated for support, in fact, if
the unwed father cannot be identified or located or is excluded from the
89. Although states may be relying upon Kahn v. Shevin, 416 U.S. 351 (1974); see note 87
supra, to justify placing a heavier burden of support on fathers than on mothers, constitutional
difficulties may arise if states place a heavier burden of support solely on unwed fathers. Stanley
probably prohibits this categorical encumbrance. Wingard v. Sill, 223 Kan. 661, 576 P.2d 620
(1978). suggests, however, that under certain circumstances imposition of this burden may bejusti-
fied. In Sill an unwed father challenged the constitutionality of the Kansas paternity act because
it placed a greater burden of support and responsibility on him than on the unwed mother. The
court upheld the statute on the ground that the mother supported the child long before the court
ordered the father to assume support. Undoubtedly, the court felt that imposing a greater burden
on the father compensated the mother for the financial burden she had carried in the past. The
court also upheld the statute in its application to only unwed fathers, reasoning that married fa-
thers were subject to similar support obligations. The court intimated, however, that even had the
unwed fathers' obligations been greater, the disparity might be justified by the period of time that
they were without obligation.
90. In some states, a statutorily defined duty to support attaches to the unwed father only
when his paternity is established in a judicial proceeding. See, e.g., Wingard v. Sill, 223 Kan. 661,
576 P.2d 620 (1978) (regardless of any moral obligation, legal responsibility does not arise until
paternity is adjudicated); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 106 3/4, § 52 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1978) (father
whose paternity is established in paternity proceeding is liable for support). In other states, how-
ever, the unwed father is deemed legally obligated to support his child from birth, but an estab-
lishment of paternity and a court order of specific payments are still required before enforcement
devices will be employed. See, e.g., N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 9:16-2, -3 (West 1976) (either parent can
bring proceeding against the other to enforce support obligations); N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 22-4-1, -3,
-8 (Supp. 1975) (same); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 10, §§ 71, 83 (West 1966) (any person can bring
proceeding to enforce father's support obligation).
Nevertheless, courts may hold an adjudicated natural father liable retroactively for expenses
that accrued before the attachment of any duty or order of support. Some statutes clearly contem-
plate retroactive extension of support liability by expressly limiting the number of years a court
can hold an illegitimate father liable retroactively for support expenses. Eg., N.M. STAT. ANN.
§ 22-4-3 (Supp. 1975) (absent a previous written demand, a parent cannot recover more than two
years' support accruing before action); UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-45a-3 (1977) (liability for past sup-
port limited to four years before action).
A support obligation attaches to an unwed father who legitimates his child. The duties owed by
a father to his legitimate child also arise when the father legitimates his child. See generally C.
FOOTE, R. LEVY & F. SANDER, supra note 76, at 644; note 76 supra and accompanying text.
Some states allow the unwed father to legitimate his child for certain purposes, without acquir-
ing a concommitant duty to support his child. See Hurst v. Wagner, 181 Wash. 498, 43 P.2d 964
(1935) (paternal acknowledgment, conferring on illegitimate child the right to inherit from the
father, did not authorize recovery from father's estate for past support expenses of child); C.
FOOTE, R. LEVY & F. SANDER, supra note 76, at 645.
Washington University Open Scholarship
1044 WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW QUARTERLY [Vol. 1979:1029
definition of "parents,"'" the husband of the child's mother is presumed
the father,92 or the unwed mother's husband consents to standing in
loco parentis as the father of the child.93
In Gomez v. Perez94 the Supreme Court nevertheless held that equal
protection requires that illegitimate children receive the same enforcea-
ble right to support granted to legitimate children.95 Arguably, there-
fore, if the support rights of illegitimate children against their natural
fathers are the same as those of legitimate children against their fathers,
then the support obligations of unwed fathers must be the same as
those of other fathers.96 In actual practice, however, this theory is not
effectuated.97
In addition to imposing a duty of support, paternity statutes com-
monly place on the adjudicated natural father liability for the unwed
mother's pregnancy expenses.98 The express imposition of this liability
on unwed fathers has been held not to distinguish unconstitutionally
married and unmarried fathers.99 Whether it impermissibly distin-
91. See notes 64-65 supra and accompanying text.
92. See notes 67-69 supra and accompanying text.
93. See Hall v. Rosen, 50 Ohio St. 2d 135, 363 N.E.2d 725 (1977).
94. 409 U.S. 535 (1973).
95. Id at 538.
96. Theoretically, the child's right is the reciprocal of the father's duty. Thus, if the child's
rights are equal, presumably the father's duties are equal. In Wingard v. Sill, 223 Kan. 661, 576
P.2d 620 (1978), the court upheld the Kansas paternity statute against an equal protection chal-
lenge that imposed a greater support obligation on the unwed father than on the married father.
The court saw no difference in the responsibility statutorily imposed on an unwed father from that
imposed on a married father by virtue of his status as a husband and the child's father. See note
89 supra. In fact, many statutes expressly impose the obligations of married fathers on unmarried
fathers. See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 26-12-4 (1975); ILL. ANN. STAT. Ch. 106 3/4, § 52 (Smith-Hurd
Supp. 1978); IND. CODE ANN. § 31-6-6-2 (Burns Supp. 1978); Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 406.011
(Baldwin 1973); Miss. CODE ANN. § 93-9-7 (1972).
97. Some unwed fathers probably never become legally obligated for support. See text ac-
companying notes 91-93 supra. Moreover, support awards for legitimate children in divorce ac-
tions are often larger than those awarded to illegitimate children under paternity orders. See C.
FOOTE, R. LEvy & F. SANDER, supra note 76, at 829. Furthermore, child support payments or-
dered pursuant to divorce statutes are almost invariably subject to modification, id. at 830, but a
paternity statute that does not authorize alterations may be read to preclude a court from modify-
ing a support order directed against unwed fathers. See Carter v. Clausen, 263 Ark. 344, 565
S.W.2d 17 (1978).
98. See Harkins, supra note 1, at 550.
99. Wingard v. Sill, 223 Kan. 661, 576 P.2d 620 (1978) (married father held jointly responsi-
ble for mother's medical expenses and thus subject to similar burden as unwed father under pater-
nity statute).
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol1979/iss4/5
Number 4] UNWED FATHERS 1045
guishes unwed mothers and unwed fathers is open to question.'t°
Paternity statutes generally stipulate the means by which a natural
father's adjudicated obligations can be enforced. Although the means
most typically specified are the ones frequently used to enforce a di-
vorced father's support obligations, 01 an unwed father may be less
subject to penal proceedings than a divorced father. 02 In S. v. D., 1°
the mother of an illegitimate child alleged that the district attorney de-
clined to prosecute the unwed father for nonsupport because of the
child's illegitimacy. The Supreme Court denied relief, holding that the
mother had no standing to enjoin the district attorney to prosecute.' °
Because the prospect that prosecution would result in payment of sup-
port was only speculative, the mother's claim lacked the requisite direct
relationship with the alleged injury.' 5 The Court's reasoning thus ef-
fectively eliminates the standing of all parties to challenge discrimina-
tory prosecution of criminal contempt0 6 and thus permits states to




Before Stanley, the unwed father's rights in proceedings for the
adoption of his illegitimate children were de minimis. °s Most states
100. See notes 86-97 supra and accompanying text.
101. See, e.g., ALA. CODE tit. 30, §§ 30-4-50, -81(7) (1975); ARIz. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 12-849,
-851 (Supp. 1978); CAL. CIV. CODE § 7012(2) (Deering Supp. 1978); CONN. GEN. STAT. § 46b-178
(1979).
102. A state, for example, might want to enforce unwed fathers' support obligations less vigor-
ously than it wishes to "punish" unwed mothers for their illicit activities. The party effectively
punished, however, is the unsupported child of the illicit relationship.
103. 410 U.S. 614 (1973).
104. Id at 619.
105. Id at 618.
106. Because the Court characterized the alleged injury as "nonsupport," the relationship be-
tween the claim and the injury would not be made more direct by substituting the illegitimate
child as the party who asserts the injury. Thus, no one has standing. If, however, the illegitimate
child can persuade the court to recharacterize the injury as one to the child's status or integrity, the
child may have standing, especially in light of the S. v. D. Court's reference to Gomez v. Perez,
409 U.S. 535 (1973).
107. The disparity in the availability of enforcement devices may be of little significance, how-
ever, because legal remedies for nonpayment of support are seldom invoked and are often ineffec-
tive when invoked. C. FOOTE, R. LEVY & F. SANDER, supra note 76, at 857.
108. Only a few appellate courts prior to Stanley permitted the unwed father to assert an
interest in his illegitimate child even though the mother had consented to the adoption. See In re
Doe, 52 Hawaii 448, 478 P.2d 844 (1970); In re Mark T., 8 Mich. App. 122, 154 N.W.2d 27 (1967);
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did not afford the father either notice of or an opportunity to be heard
on the prospective adoption. 0 9 The majority of adoption statutes re-
quired only the consent of the unwed mother; the unwed father's con-
sent was not a prerequisite to adoption." 0
Although Stanley did not focus on the unwed father's rights in adop-
tion proceedings, language in the opinion suggests that reasonable ef-
forts should be made to notify unwed fathers of a proposed
adoption."' Conceivably, the state's interest in promoting the adop-
tion of illegitimate children may render the procedural due process
rights of unwed fathers in adoptions less substantial than in other pro-
ceedings. In any event, Stanley left unclear the precise scope of any
procedural requirements in adoption actions." 2
Rothstein v. Lutheran Social Services" 3 further muddled the vague
requirements of procedural due process in adoption proceedings. In
Rothstein the Supreme Court vacated and remanded, in light of Stanley
v. Illinois, 14 a Wisconsin case upholding the constitutionality of a state
adoption law that denied the unwed father his substantive parental
rights and his procedural right to notice of a preliminary hearing." S
Although the Court's remand has been more broadly interpreted," t6
some courts read Rothstein merely to affirm the right of unwed fathers
to be heard in adoption proceedings." 7 Some of those courts urge that
In re Brennan, 270 Minn. 455, 134 N.W.2d 126 (1965); State exrel. Baby Girl M., 25 Utah 2d 101,
476 P.2d 1013 (1970).
109. See H. CLARK, LAW OF DOMESTIc RELATIONS §§ 18.1, .4 (1968).
110. See H. CLARK, supra note 109, at §§ 18.4, .5; Tabler, supra note 75. According to one
author, "The view was that the process of acquiring such consent would substantially hamper the
work of welfare agencies concerned with adoption. Moreover, it could place all adoptions in a
legally unstable position for extended periods of time." Schwartz, supra note 78, at 14.
111. The Court suggested that the incremental cost of affording unwed fathers an opportunity
for a properly focused hearing in an adoption proceeding would be minimal. 405 U.S. at 657 n.9.
The Court then spoke of "extending opportunity for hearing to unwed fathers who desire and
claim competence to care for their children" and cited the Illinois statute that extended notice to
both known and unknown fathers. Id
In a related discussion, a commentator maintains that "the constitutional duty of notice to the
unwed father with respect to the termination of his parental rights requires a good faith effort by
the state to notify him of a termination proceeding, even if such a father is unknown." Barron,
supra note 27, at 546. See generalli note 27 supra and accompanying text.
112. See notes 22-23, 26-31 supra and accompanying text.
113. 405 U.S. 1051 (1972).
114. Id
115. Lewis v. Social Servs., 47 Wis. 2d 420, 428, 178 N.W.2d 56, 60 (1970).
116. See note 121 infra.
117. See, e.g., Slawek v. Covenant Children's Home, 52 I1. 2d 20, 284 N.E.2d 291 (1972).
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol1979/iss4/5
Number 4] UNWED FATHERS 1047
Rothstein establishes a constitutional right to notice and hearing for all
unwed fathers.'1  The remaining courts restrict that right to custodial
or responsible fathers.' 9
Although Stanley and Rothstein did not expound upon the substan-
tive due process rights of unwed fathers in the adoption context, 120 both
cases have been cited as recognizing the existence of such rights.' 2 '
Few states, however, have granted all unwed fathers the authority to
veto the adoption of their illegitimate children, even if similar authority
is vested in all other parents. 122 Today, most adoption statutes require
consent of only those unwed fathers who have asserted or established
their parental role. 23
Quilloin v. Walcott 24 indicates that the substantive due process rights
of some unwed fathers in adoption proceedings may be limited. Al-
though the unwed father was not found unfit, the Quilloin Court held
that a paternal veto could be denied if in the child's best interests.1
2 5
The Court suggested, however, that the father must have an opportu-
118. See, e.g., id. (all unwed fathers must be given notice and right to hearing in adoption
proceedings); c. In re Adoption of Lathrop. 575 P.2d 894 (Kan. Ct. App. 1978) (all unwed fathers
must be given notice of proposed adoption).
119. See, e.g., Department of Health and Rehabilitative Servs. v. Herzog, 317 So. 2d 865 (Fla.
Dist. Ct. App. 1975) (all unwed fathers need not be given notice and opportunity to be heard
before child can be adopted; within judge's discretion not to seek out natural father); In re Ken-
neth M., 87 Misc. 2d 295, 383 N.Y.S.2d 1005 (Fam. Ct. 1976) (unwed father who never lived with
child not entitled to notice and hearing in adoption proceedings).
120. For a discussion of Stanley's ambiguity on the requirements of substantive due process in
various proceedings, see note 22 supra. In Rothstein the Court simply remanded the case in light
of Stanley; it did not state that the unwed father's consent was a prerequisite to a valid adoption.
121. Quilloin v. Walcott, 434 U.S. 246, 247-48, 254-55 (1978), and Caban v. Mohammed, 441
U.S. 380, 394 n.16, 414-15 (1979) (Stevens, J., dissenting), cited Stanley for this proposition. The
Wisconsin court on remand of Rothstein held that the state adoption law unconstitutionally de-
nied the rights of unwed fathers; the consent of both the father and the mother of an illegitimate
child was thereafter necessary. 59 Wis. 2d 1, 207 N.W.2d 826 (1973).
122. See Appendix C (table of adoption statutes). But cf. Adoption of Walker, 568 Pa. 165,
360 A.2d 603 (1976) (provision in state adoption act requiring the consent of only the mother for
adoption of illegitimate child declared unconstitutional under Pennsylvania Equal Rights Amend-
ment).
123. See Appendix C (table of adoption statutes); In re Tricia M., 74 Cal. App. 3d 125, 141
Cal. Rptr. 554 (1977) (natural father has right to veto adoption); cf In re Johnson, 54 I11. App. 3d
627, 370 N.E.2d 560 (1977) (natural father not declared unfit has right to veto adoption); In re
Gerald G.G., 61 A.D.2d 521, 403 N.Y.S.2d 57 (1978) (devoted and concerned natural father has
right to veto adoption in child's best interests).
124. 434 U.S. 246 (1978).
125. Id at 255. See note 33 supra and accompanying text.
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nity to offer evidence of his fitness.1 26 Furthermore, the unwed father's
failure to exercise or seek actual or legal custody over the child 27 and
his attempt to break up a de facto family unit were crucial to the
Court's decision.' 28 Thus, all unwed fathers may have some protected
substantive rights in adoption proceedings, t29 but the substantive rights
of an unwed father in a Quilloin-type situation can be "restricted" by
the "best interests" standard. 30
Both Quilloin and Caban v. Mohammed'3 ' examined the equal pro-
tection rights of unwed fathers in adoption proceedings. Quiloin held
that a noncustodial, irresponsible father could be given less veto au-
thority than a married father. 3 2 Similarly, Caban suggested that clas-
sifications between unwed mothers and unwed fathers who had not
established substantial relationships with their children might be per-
126. 434 U.S. at 253. See notes 47-48 supra and accompanying text.
127. 434 U.S. at 255. See text accompanying note 38 supra.
128. The Court emphasized that fully recognizing a de facto family unit was a substantial
countervailing interest not present in Stanley. 434 U.S. at 248, 255. See note 38, supra and ac-
companying text.
129. See note 43 supra and accompanying text.
130. Cf. Berry v. Samuels, 145 Ga. App. 687, 244 S.E.2d 593 (1978) (unwed father who never
sought to legitimate child and never shouldered any significant responsibility for child had no
standing to object to adoption by maternal aunt who had custody of child for several years); In re
Adoption of Lathrop, 575 P.2d 894 (Kan. Ct. App. 1978) (unwed father who does not appear and
assert his desire to care for child after notified of pending adoption need not consent to adoption).
The extent that substantive rights may be restricted, however, remains unclear after Quilloin.
See notes 44-45, 47 supra and accompanying text. The Court did not discuss other countervailing
interests that might be deemed substantial or other permissible ivays to distinguish among unwed
fathers for the purpose of analyzing the substantive restraints of due process. Compare Adoption
of Marie R., 79 Cal. App. 3d 624, 145 Cal. Rptr. 122 (1978) (putative father who had not main-
tained contact with child cannot object to adoption sought by unwed mother even though mother
prevented him from contacting child), with In re Adoption of Lathrop, 575 P.2d 894 (Kan. Ct.
App. 1978) (unwed father's parental rights cannot be lessened by virtue of his failure to perform
his parental responsibilities if he has been prevented from doing so by outside agencies). Conpare
also In re Martin, 357 So. 2d 893 (La. Ct. App. 1978) (unwed father's consent to adoption not
necessary if he did not formally acknowledge or legitimate child), with Aslin v. Seamon, 225 Kan.
77, 587 P.2d 875 (1978) (unwed father who notoriously and in writing recognized his paternity
must consent to adoption even if he is not adjudicated the natural father); Caban v. Mohammed,
441 U.S. 380, 393 n.14 (1979) (Court emphasized significance of"the relationship that in fact exists
between the parent and child"), with Parham v. Hughes, 441 U.S. 347 (1979) (Court upheld statute
requiring formal legitimation of child as prerequisite for unwed father to sue for child's wrongful
death).
131. 441 U.S. 380 (1979).
132. Quilloin did not purport to hold that unwed fathers who had assumed some parental
responsibility for their children could be granted less veto authority than other fathers. In fact,
Caban expressly reserved that question for future consideration. Id. at 394 n.16
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missible.133 As a general proposition, therefore, the interest of a state in
promoting the adoption of illegitimate children may justify most classi-
fications between noncustodial, irresponsible fathers and other classes
of parents.
IV. CUSTODY RIGHTS
At common law the unwed mother had a "natural" right to the cus-
tody of her illegitimate child.'3 4 As case law developed, the unwed fa-
ther acquired a right to custody superior to all persons except the
mother.' 3- In custody cases stemming from divorce, courts developed a
judicial preference for the mother as custodian.' 36 Courts applied a
more-stringent preference, however, to cases in which an unwed
mother asserted a right to custody of her illegitimate child. 13  Before
Stanley, in fact, the unwed father had to prove maternal unfitness to
obtain custody. 138
Stanley provides little guidance for analyzing the conflicting interests
of unmarried parents in a custody decision. 39 Stanley clearly prohibits
states from summarily vesting in all unwed mothers the exclusive right
to custody of their illegitimate child,'4 but whether Stanley absolutely
133. See notes 59-60 supra and accompanying text. Caban held only that an infiexible denial
to all unwed fathers of the veto authority granted unwed mothers violated equal protection. See
note 57 supra and accompanying text.
134. See Reeves, supra note I, at 116-17 (citing Queen v. Nash, 10 Q.B.D. 454 (C.A. 1883);
The King v. Hopkins, 103 Eng. Rep. 224 (K.B. 1806); The King v. Soper, I01 Eng. Rep. 156 (K.B.
1793)).
135. See Schwartz, supra note 78, at 8.
136. See C. FOOTE, R. LEVY & F. SANDER, supra note 76, at 408. The presumption was often
referred to as the "tender years doctrine." Id This preference applied only to custody disputes
over young children.
137. See Marcus, Equal Protection: The Custody of the Illegitimate Child, 11 J. FAM. L. 1, 23
(1971).
138. Roe v. Doe, 58 Misc. 2d 75, 296 N.Y.S.2d 865 (Fam. Ct. 1968); Meredith v. Meredith, 272
A.D. 79, 69 N.Y.S.2d 462, aft'd, 297 N.Y. 692, 77 N.E.2d 8 (1947); Jolly v. Queen, 264 N.C. 711,
142 S.E.2d 592 (1965). See generally, Tabler supra note 75.
Typical of the statutes embodying the mother's prima facie right were CAL. CIV. CODE ANN.
§ 200 (Deering 1971) and OR. REV. STAT. § 109.080 (1968). See generally Marcus, supra note 137.
139. See note 23 supra.
140. Statutes vesting an exclusive right to custody in unwed mothers would be tantamount to a
presumption that all unmarried fathers are unsuitable parents; Stanley held this presumption in-
valid. See note 69 supra See also notes 141-42 infra and accompanying text. In apparent conflict
with Stanley however, some statutes continue to vest a right to custody of illegitimate children
solely in unwed mothers. See, e.g., N.J. STAT. ANN. § 9:16-1 (West 1976) (mother has exclusive
right to custody and control; however, E. v. T., 124 N.J. Super 535, 308 A.2d 41 (1973), held this
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prohibits the granting of any preference to unwed mothers in custody
decisions is not clear.
Vanderlaan v. Vanderlaan,141 a case vacated and remanded in light of
Stanley, suggests that a strong presumption in favor of the unwed
mother will not withstand judicial scrutiny if the best interests of the
illegitimate child would be served by allowing the father to retain cus-
tody.142 Yet, in expressly recognizing the unwed father's right to the
"companionship, care, custody and management" of his children,143
Quilloin suggests that the degree of constitutional protection afforded a
particular unwed father's parental rights may turn on the father's past
and present relationship with his child and the presence or absence of
substantial countervailing interests.' 44 Thus, states may be permitted,
in the dhild's best interest, to give precedence to the judicial preference
of maternal custody over the custody rights of some unwed fathers. 45
section inapplicable to an admitted natural father); S.D. CoMP. LAWS ANN. § 25-5-10 (1976)
(mother entitled to custody).
Some states give only certain unwed fathers a right to custody. See, e.g., GA. CODE ANN. § 74-
203 (1973) (mother entitled to possession of child unless the father legitimates the child); UTAH
CODE ANN. § 77-60-12 (1978) (father has no right to custody of child under 10 years old unless
mother is unfit). These latter, more "tailored," laws may be valid under Quilloin and the implica-
tions of Caban. See notes 40-42, 44-45, 48, 59-62 supra and accompanying text.
141. 405 U.S. 1051 (1972). The Supreme Court vacated and remanded a state appellate
court's reversal of a trial court determination that it was in the best interests of the illegitimate
children to remain in the custody of their father. The state appellate court had invoked the state
public policy against granting unwed fathers custody. See Vanderlaan v. Vanderlaan, 126 111.
App. 2d 410, 262 N.E.2d 717 (1970).
142. Because the mother in Vanderlaan contested the unwed father's custody, the case was
unlike Stanley, in which the conflicting rights of an unwed mother were not present. See note 23
supra. By its remand the Court nevertheless suggested that the mother's custody rights cannot
override the father's, at least if the child's best interests do not so require.
143. Quilloin v. Walcott, 434 U.S. 246, 248 (1978).
144. See note 40 supra and accompanying text; cf. Caban v. Mohammed, 441 U.S. 380, 393
n.14 (1979) (emphasizing the significance of an established parental relationship).
145. Caban v. Mohammed, 441 U.S. 380 (1979), indicates that in these circumstances a mater-
nal preference may be inflexibly applied to all unwed fathers of newborns. In Caban the majority
as well as the dissent suggest that the parental interests of unwed mothers and unwed fathers of
newborns might be permissibly distinguished. See notes 61-62 supra and accompanying text. In
fact, one dissenting justice specifically cited with approval the custodial preference given unwed
mothers. 441 U.S. 380, 398-401 (Stewart, J., dissenting).
Cf. Boatwright v. Otero, 91 Misc. 2d 653, 398 N.Y.S.2d 391 (Fain. Ct. 1977) (if unadjudicated
father who has openly acknowledged paternity and maintained an ongoing relationship with his
child seeks custody, mother has no prima facie right to custody; custody determination turns on
best interests of the child); In re Wright, 52 Ohio Misc. 4, 367 N.E.2d 931 (Ct. C.P. 1977) (putative
father's custody right subject to unwed mother's superior right to custody, but admitted and adju-
dicated father's custody right, like the mother's, is subject to "best interests of the child").
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol1979/iss4/5
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Many states have abolished the tender years doctrine 14 6 in custody
disputes over legitimate children. 147 Despite these changes, however, a
strong maternal presumption might remain for children born out of
wedlock.' 48  Imposition of a "maternal preference" on the custody
rights of unwed fathers without a similar imposition upon the custody
rights of other fathers may implicate fourteenth amendment equal pro-
tection problems, yet Quilloin suggests that some unwed fathers may be
validly classified apart from other fathers.'
49
V. VISITATION RIGHTS
As the parental role of unwed fathers expanded under the law, judi-
cial recognition of visitation rights for unwed fathers correspondingly
grew,' although these rights were never absolute.' 5 Before Stanley
only six states granted an unwed father visitation privileges over the
opposition of the mother.'52 Today, however, those states which have
considered the question of unwed father's visitation rights overwhelm-
ingly grant the father a right to reasonable visitation if visitation serves
the child's best interest.s'
146. See note 136 supra and accompanying text.
147. See, e.g., Bazemore v. Davis. 394 A.2d 1377 (D.C. 1978); Spriggs v. Carson, 470 Pa. 290,
368 A.2d 635 (1977). See genera'ly C. FOOTE, R. LEVY & F. SANDER, supra note 76, at 409;
Solomon, The Father's Revolution in Custody Cases, 13 TRIAL 32, 33 (1977).
148. See Foster & Freed, supra note 89, at 337. But cf Neal v. White, 362 So. 2d 1148 (La. Ct.
App. 1978) (standard for custody determination is identical whether child is legitimate or illegiti-
mate); Peterson v. Hayes, 252 Pa. Super. Ct. 487, 381 A.2d 1311 (1977) (same).
149. Quilloin suggests that unwed fathers who have never shouldered any significant parental
responsibility for their children can be distinguished from other fathers. See note 48 supra and
accompanying text. Thus, such fathers might be given less potent custody rights than other fa-
thers.
150. Reeves, supra note 1, at 117.
151. "[O]nly a few states allowed the putative father visitation privileges where the mother
ha[d] custody and oppose[d] the visits." Reeves, supra note 1, at 117 n.16.
152. See Strong v. Owens, 91 Cal. App. 336, 205 P.2d 48 (1949); Mixon v. Mize, 198 So. 2d 373
(Fla. Dist. Ct. App.), cert. denied, 204 So. 2d 211 (1967); Baker v. Baker, 81 N.J. Eq. 135, 85 A. 816
(Prerog. Ct. 1913); Anonymous v. Anonymous, 56 Misc. 2d 711, 289 N.Y.S.2d 792 (Fam. Ct.
1968); Exparte Hendrix, 186 Okla. 712, 100 P.2d 444 (1940); Commonwealth v. Rozanski, 206 Pa.
Super. 397, 213 A.2d 155 (1965). See generall Tabler, supra note 75, at 231-36.
153. Wingard v. Sill, 223 Kan. 661, 665, 576 P.2d 620, 624 (1978). See Bagwell v. Powell, 267
Ala. 19, 99 So. 2d 195 (1957); Strong v. Owens, 91 Cal. App. 2d 336, 205 P.2d 48 (1949); Forestiere
v. Doyle, 30 Conn. Supp. 284, 310 A.2d 607 (Super. Ct. 1973); In re One Minor Child, 295 A.2d
727 (Del. 1972); Mixon v. Mize, 198 So. 2d 373 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.), cert. denied, 204 So. 2d 211
(1967); Vallera v. Rivera, 39 Ill. App. 3d 775, 351 N.E.2d 391 (1976); Taylor v. Taylor, 295 So. 2d
494 (La. Ct. App.), cert. denied, 299 So. 2d 799 (1974); Gardner v. Rothman, 370 Mass. 79, 345
N.E.2d 370 (1976); Turner v. Saka, 90 Nev. 54, 518 P.2d 608 (1974); Baker v. Baker, 81 N.J. Eq.
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Neither Stanley nor Quilloin addressed the question of whether the
Constitution protects an unwed father's interests in visiting and being
visited by his illegitimate children, although both cases found the un-
wed father's interest in the "companionship, care, custody and manage-
ment" of his children to be "cognizable and substantial." 154 Numerous
state court cases have afforded constitutional protection to unwed fa-
thers' visitation interests, 55 and a few cases have suggested that unwed
fathers have a right to a forum in which to establish their visitation
rights.156 Thus, a constitutional basis arguably exists for an unwed fa-
ther's right to reasonable visitation privileges.5 7
The extent of that protection nevertheless raises an entirely different
question. Quilloin suggests that the visitation privileges of irresponsible
fathers may be subjected to the "best interests of the child" test or even
withheld altogether.'58 Caban suggests that the visitation rights of an
unwed father who has established a substantial relationship with his
child cannot be denied by the mother's veto.' 59 It remains to be seen,
135, 85 A. 816 (Prerog. Ct. 1913); "Francois" v. "Ivanova," 14 A.D.2d 317, 221 N.Y.S.2d 75
(1961); Exparte Hendrix, 186 Okla. 712, 100 P.2d 444 (1940); Commonwealth v. Rozanski, 206
Pa. Super. 397, 213 A.2d 155 (1965); In re Guardianship of Harp, 6 Wash. App. 701, 495 P.2d
1059 (1972); Slawek v. Stroh, 62 Wis. 2d 295, 215 N.W.2d 9 (1974). See also Ritchie v. Ritchie, 58
Ill. App. 3d 1045, 374 N.E.2d 1292 (1978); In re Gerald G.G., 61 A.D.2d 521, 403 N.Y.S.2d 57
(Sup. Ct. 1978).
154. Quilloin v. Walcott, 434 U.S. 246, 248 (1978) (emphasis added); Stanley v. Illinois, 405
U.S. 645, 652 (1972) (emphasis added).
155. See, e.g., Wingard v. Sill, 223 Kan. 661, 576 P.2d 620 (1978) (Stanley indicates that fit
unwed father is entitled at reasonable times to visit child in custody of unwed mother); Peterson v.
Hayes, 252 Pa. Super. Ct. 487, 381 A.2d 1311 (1977) (Stanley indicates that visitation rights of
unwed father determined by same standard used for other fathers); J.M.S. v. H.A., 242 S.E.2d 696
(W. Va. 1978) (denial of visitation rights to unwed father without a hearing violates due process
and equal protection).
156. See Felder v. Allsopp, 391 A.2d 243 (D.C. 1978), in which the court held that the pater-
nity act's statute of limitations did not bar the unwed father from establishing visitation rights in
an equitable proceeding.
[M]e cannot here deny a forum to the unwed parent of a child seeking visitation rights
without raising the specter of a denial of equal protection. See Stanley v. Illinois, 405
U.S. 645, 92 S. Ct. 1208, 31 L.E.2d 551 (1971). As we have said, "the right to visitation-
the right to be with one's child-is the preeminent parental right .
391 A.2d at 245.
157. But cf Schwartz, supra note 78, at 12-13 (three considerations may prompt court to hold
visitation not to be a "constitutional right": visitation may encourage renewal of meretricious
relationship; visitation will remind people of child's illegitimacy; and visitation can reduce
mother's likelihood of adjusting and forming normal family relationship).
158. See notes 40-42 supra and accompanying text.
159. See notes 59-60, 140 supra and accompanying text.
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however, how the potential countervailing interest of the custodial fam-
ily unit will be weighed in this analysis.
VI. CONCLUSION
Though the parental rights and obligations of unwed fathers were
once minimal, they now more closely match those of other parents. As
a result of Stanley and its progeny, unwed fathers enjoy significant
rights in the adoption, custody, and visitation of their illegitimate chil-
dren. Nevertheless, the ambiguities and the narrow range of issues
confronted in these cases leave open questions concerning which fa-
thers shall receive constitutional protection and which protections shall
be afforded to unwed fathers in various situations and proceedings.
Michael N. Kern
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APPENDIX A
The following states recognize a presumption of legitimacy.
Alabama: Butler v. Butler, 254 Ala. 375, 48 So. 2d 318 (1950).
Alaska: 1962 Op. Att'y Gen., No. 13.
California: Kusior v. Silver, 54 Cal. 2d 603, 354 P.2d 657, 7 Cal. Rptr. 129
(1960).
Colorado: COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 19-6-105 (1973).
Florida: Knauer v. Barnett, 360 So. 2d 399 (Fla. 1978).
Georgia: GA. CODE ANN. § 74-101 (1973).
Idaho: IDAHO CODE § 7-1119 (1979).
Illinois: ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 106 3/4, § 5 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1979).
Indiana: Profitt v. Profitt, 137 Ind. App. 6, 204 N.E.2d 660 (1964).
Iowa: Kuhns v. Olson, 258 Iowa 1274, 141 N.W.2d 925 (1966).
Kentucky: Williams v. Williams, 311 Ky. 45, 223 S.W.2d 360 (1949).
Maryland: Hale v. State, 175 Md. 319, 2 A.2d 17 (1938).
Michigan: People v. Chase, 171 Mich. 282, 137 N.W. 55 (1912).
Mississippi: Stone v. Stone, 210 So. 2d 672 (Miss. 1968).
Missouri: Bower v. Graham, 285 Mo. 151, 225 S.W. 978 (1920).
Nebraska: In re McDermott's Estate, 125 Neb. 179, 249 N.W. 555 (1933).
New Hampshire: Watts v. Watts, 115 N.H. 186, 337 A.2d 350 (1975).
New Jersey: L. v. M., 134 N.J. Super 69, 338 A.2d 227 (1975).
New Mexico: Melvin v. Kazhe, 83 N.M. 356, 492 P.2d 138 (1971).
New York: Stillman v. Stillman, 240 N.Y. 268, 148 N.E. 518 (1925).
North Carolina: State v. Green, 210 N.C. 162, 185 S.E. 670 (1936).
Ohio: Kawecki v. Kawecki, 67 Ohio App. 34, 35 N.E.2d 865 (1941).
Oklahoma: OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 10, § 1 (1966).
Oregon: OR. REV. STAT. §§ 41.350(6), .360(31) (1977).
Pennsylvania: Sheaffer Adoption, 58 LANC. REV. 15 (Orphans' Ct. 1961).
South Carolina: Tarleton v. Thompson, 125 S.C. 182, 118 S.E. 421 (1923).
South Dakota: S.D. COMP. LAWS ANN. §§ 25-5-1, -3 (1976).




Texas: Adams v. Adams, 456 S.W.2d 222 (Tex. Civ. App. 1970).
Utah: Holder v. Holder, 9 Utah 2d 163, 340 P.2d 761 (1959).
Washington: Carfa v. Albright, 39 Wash. 2d 697, 237 P.2d 795 (1951).
West Virginia: Lipscomb v. Joplin, 131 W.Va. 302, 47 S.E.2d 221 (1948).
Wisconsin: Wis. STAT. ANN. § 891.39 (West 1971).
The following states have enacted the Uniform Parentage Act, which recog-
nizes a presumption of paternity.
California: CAL. CIV. CODE §§ 7000-7018 (Deering Supp. 1979).
Colorado: COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 19-6-101 to -129 (1973).
Hawaii: HAWAII REV. STAT. §§ 584-1 to -26 (1976).
Montana: MONT. REV. CODES ANN. §§ 61-301 to -334 (Supp. 1977).
Nevada: 1979 Nev. Stats. ch. 599.
North Dakota: N.D. CENT. CODE §§ 14-17-01 to -26 (Supp. 1977).
Washington: WASH. REV. CODE ANN. §§ 26.26.010-.905 (Supp. 1978).
Wyoming: Wyo. STAT. §§ 14-2-101 to -120 (1977).
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APPENDIX B
The following states recognize as legitimate those children born out of wed-
lock whose natural parents subsequently marry. In addition to marriage, these
states may require the father either explicitly or implicitly to recognize the
child as his own through some formal act, court proceeding, or other course of
conduct.
Alabama: ALA. CODE tit. 26, § 26-11-1 (1975).
Alaska: ALASKA STAT. § 25.20.050(a) (1977).
Connecticut: CONN. GEN. STAT. § 45-274(b) (1979).
Delaware: DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 13, § 1301 (1974).
Florida: FLA. STAT. ANN. § 742.091 (West Supp. 1979).
Georgia: GA. CODE ANN. § 74-101 (1973).
Hawaii: HAWAII REV. STAT. § 338-21 (1976).
Idaho: IDAHO CODE § 32-1006 (1963).
Illinois: ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 40, § 303 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1979).
Indiana: IND. CODE ANN. § 29-1-2-7 (Bums 1972).
Iowa: IOWA CODE ANN. § 595.18 (West Supp. 1979).
Kansas: KAN. STAT. ANN. § 23-125 (1974).
Kentucky: KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 391.090(3) (Baldwin 1978).
Louisiana: LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 198 (West 1952).
Maine: 1979 Me. Leg. Serv. tit. 18a, § 2-109.
Maryland: MD. EST. & TRUSTS CODE ANN. § 1-208 (1974).
Massachusetts: MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 190, § 7 (Michie/Law. Co-op 1969).
Michigan: MICH. STAT ANN. § 27.3178(153) (Supp. 1979).
Minnesota: MINN. STAT. ANN. § 517.19 (West Supp. 1979).
Mississippi: Miss. CODE ANN. § 91-1-15 (1972).
Missouri: Mo. REV. STAT. § 474.070 (1978).
Montana: MONT. REV. CODES ANN. § 40-6-203 (1979).
Nebraska: NEB. REV. STAT. § 13-109 (1977).
New Hampshire: N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 457:42 (1968).
New Jersey: N.J. STAT. ANN. § 9:15-1 (West 1976).
New Mexico: N.M. STAT. ANN. § 29-1-20 (1954).
New York: N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW § 24 (McKinney 1977).
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North Carolina: N.C. GEN. STAT. § 49-12 (1976).
Ohio: OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2105.18 (Page Supp. 1978).
Oklahoma: OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 10, § 2 (West 1966).
Pennsylvania: 20 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 2107 (Purdon Supp. 1979), 48
PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 167 (Purdon Supp. 1979).
Rhode Island: R.I. GEN. LAWS § 15-8-21 (1970).
South Carolina: S.C. CODE § 20-1-60 (1977).
South Dakota: S.D. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 25-5-5 (1976).
Tennessee: TENN. CODE ANN. § 36-307 (1977).
Utah: UTAH CODE ANN. § 77-60-14 (1978).
Vermont: VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 14, § 554 (1974).
West Virginia: W. VA. CODE § 42-1-6 (1966).
Wisconsin: WIS. STAT. ANN. § 48.84 (West Supp. 1978).
The following states legitimate the illegitimate children of those fathers who
assert or acknowledge their paternity through some act or course of conduct.
Alabama: ALA. CODE tit. 26, § 26-11-2 (1975).
Alaska: ALASKA STAT. § 25.20.050(a) (1977).
Connecticut: CONN. GEN. STAT. § 45-274(b) (1979).
Delaware: DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 13, § 1301 (1974).
Georgia: GA. CODE ANN. § 74-103 (1973).
Hawaii: HAWAII REV. STAT. § 338-21 (1976).
Idaho: IDAHO CODE § 16-1510 (Supp. 1978).
Indiana: IND. CODE ANN. § 29-1-2-7 (Bums 1972).
Louisiana: LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 200 (West Supp. 1979).
Maryland: MD. EST. & TRUSTS CODE ANN. § 1-208 (1974).
Michigan: MICH. STAT. ANN. § 27.3178(153) (West Supp. 1979).
Mississippi: MIss. CODE ANN. § 93-17-1 (1972).
Nebraska: NEB. REV. STAT. § 13-109 (1977).
New York: N.Y. EST., POWERS & TRUSTS LAW § 4-1.2 (McKinney 1967).
North Carolina: N.C. GEN. STAT. § 49-10 (Supp. 1977).
Ohio: OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2105.18 (Page Supp. 1978).
Oklahoma: OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 10, § 55 (West 1966).
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South Dakota: S.D. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 25-6-1 (1976).
Tennessee: TENN. CODE ANN. § 36-301-03 (1977).




The following states require all illegitimate fathers to consent to the adoption
of their illegitimate children.
Arizona: ARIz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 8-106 (Supp. 1978) (consent of both
natural parents necessary).
Illinois: ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 4, § 9.1-8 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1979); (parents
of all children required to give consent).
Iowa: IOWA CODE ANN. §§ 600.3, 600A.8 (West Supp. 1979) (father's con-
sent required).
Montana: 1979 Mont. Laws ch. 33, § 40-8-111 (1979) (consent of both par-
ents required).
Oregon: OR. REV. STAT. § 109.312 (1977) (consent of parents required).
Rhode Island: R.I. GEN. LAWS § 15-7-5 (1977) (consent of parents re-
quired).
South Dakota: S.D. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 25-6-4 (1976) (parents required
to consent).
Wisconsin: Wis. STAT. ANN. § 48.84 (West Supp. 1979) (consent of father
required).
The following states require certain illegitimate fathers to consent to the adop-
tion of their illegitimate children.
Alabama: ALA. CODE tit. 26, § 26-10-3 (1975) (father's consent required
when his paternity established); Roe v. Corn, 417 F. Supp. 769
(D. Ala. 1976) (father's consent required after legitimation).
Alaska: ALASKA STAT. § 20.15.050(a)(3) (Supp. 1979) (consent of natural
father required if married to mother at time of or after conception
of child); id § 20.15.040(a)(2) (1975) (consent required if father
legitimates child).
California: CAL. CIV. CODE §§ 224, 7004 (Deering Supp. 1979) (presumed
father required to consent).
Colorado: COLO. REV. STAT. §§ 19-1-103(21), -4-107(1)(g), -6-105 (Supp.
1978) (presumed father required to consent).
Connecticut: CONN. GEN. STAT. §§ 45-61d, -61(i)(b)(2) (1979) (father's
consent required if his paternity has been acknowledged or
adjudicated, or if he has regularly contributed to child's sup-
port).
Delaware: DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 13, §§ 906(7)(b), 908(2) (Supp. 1978) (nat-
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ural father's consent required if father identified and if in best
interests of child).
Florida: FLA. STAT. ANN. § 63.062 (West Supp. 1979) (father's consent re-
quired if paternity established, paternity acknowledged, or if fa-
ther provided support in repetitive, customary manner).
Hawaii: HAWAIr REV. STAT. § 578-2(a) (1976) (adjudicated father, pre-
sumed father, and concerned natural father must consent).
Idaho: IDAHO CODE §§ 16-504, -1510 (Supp. 1978) (father's consent re-
quired if he acknowledges child and receives it into his family).
Indiana: IND. CODE ANN. § 31-3-1-6(a) (Bums Supp. 1979) (father whose
paternity judicially established must consent).
Kentucky: Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 199.500 (Baldwin 1978) (consent of fa-
ther required if paternity judicially established or acknowl-
edged by affidavit).
Louisiana: LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 9:404 (West 1965) (parental rights of
father not terminated by mother's consent to adoption when
father has acknowledged or legitimated the child).
Maine: ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 19, § 532-C (Supp. 1978) (known father
who establishes parental rights to the child must consent to adop-
tion).
Maryland: MD. CODE ANN. art. 16, § 74 (1973) (father's consent required
for legitimated child).
Michigan: MICH. STAT. ANN. §§ 27.3178 (555.33), 27.3178 (555.37) (Supp.
1979) (father whose identity and whereabouts are known and
who has made provision for child's care must consent to adop-
tion).
Minnesota: MINN. STAT. ANN. §§ 259.24, .26 (West Supp. 1978) (father's
consent required when father has substantially supported
child, has openly lived with child, has filed an affidavit stating
his intention to retain parental rights, or has been adjudicated
child's parent).
New Hampshire: N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 170-R:5, :6 (1977) (father's
consent required if father known and files notice of in-
tent to claim paternity).
New Jersey: In re Adoption of B., 152 N.J. Super. 546, 378 A.2d 90 (1977)
(though not classified a "parent" under N.J. REV. STAT. § 9:3-
18 (1976), father's consent required when father has not for-
saken his parental obligation toward child).
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New Mexico: N.M. STAT. ANN. § 22-2-25 (Supp. 1975) (father's consent
required when father's paternity acknowledged or previ-
ously established in judicial proceeding).
New York: In re Gerald G. G., 61 A.D.2d 521, 403 N.Y.S.2d 57 (Sup. Ct.
1978) (though father's consent not expressly required, N.Y.
Dom. REL. LAW § Ill (McKinney 1977), natural father who
has been a devoted and unwed parent must consent). See gen-
erally Caban v. Mohammed 441 U.S. 380 (1979).
North Carolina: N.C. GEN. STAT. § 48-6 (Supp. 1977) (father's consent re-
quired if father substantially supported child, if his pater-
nity was judicially established or acknowledged, or if
child was legitimated).
North Dakota: N.D. CENT. CODE §§ 14-15-05, -06 (1971) (father's consent
required if child legitimated).
Ohio: OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3107.06 (Page Supp. 1978) (father's con-
sent required if his paternity judicially established).
South Carolina: S.C. CODE § 15-45-70 (Supp. 1978) (father's consent re-
quired if he has consistently exercised parental rights and
performed parental duties).
Tennessee: TENN. CODE ANN. § 36-111 (1977) (father's consent required if
child legitimated).
Utah: UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-30-4 (1977) (father's consent required if he
has filed notice of his claim of paternity before placement of child).
Washington: WASH. REV. CODE §§ 26.32.030, .040 (Supp. 1978).
West Virginia: W. VA. CODE § 48-4-1 (Supp. 1978) (consent of judicially
or personally declared father required).
Wyoming: Wyo. STAT. § 1-22-109 (1977) (father's consent required if
name known).
The following states do not require illegitimate fathers to consent to the adop-
tion of their illegitimate children.
Georgia: GA. CODE ANN. § 74-203 (1973) (father is not "recognized" par-
ent and his consent is not required). See Quilloin v. Walcott, 238
Ga. 230, 232 S.E.2d 246 (1977), affd, 434 U.S. 246 (1978).
Kansas: KAN. STAT. ANN. § 59-2102 (1976) (only mother of illegitimate
child required to consent to child's adoption).
Massachusetts: MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 210, § 2 (Michie/Law. Co-op Supp.
1978) (only mother's consent required).
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Mississippi: MISS. CODE ANN. § 93-17-5 (1972) (father not deemed a par-
ent for purposes of adoption).
Missouri: Mo. REV. STAT. § 453.030 (1978) (only mother's consent re-
quired).
Oklahoma: OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 10, §§ 60.5, .6 (West Supp. 1978) (fa-
ther's consent not required).
Pennsylvania: I PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 411 (Purdon Supp. 1979) (fa-
ther's consent not necessary).
Vermont: VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 435 (Supp. 1979) (mother's consent
sufficient).
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